Skip to content
DETERMINISTIC SAFETY FOR HETEROGENEOUS ROBOT FLEETS

Any robot. Any vendor. Never an unsafe command.

Deploy AI planners on mixed-vendor cells without ever letting an unsafe command reach hardware.

Watch a UR3e + Dobot simulator cell reject an unsafe LLM command, 30 min, with engineering.

  • UR3e + Dobot sim
  • 3 / 3 quorum
  • Z3 bounded 200 ms
  • SHA-256 audit log
  • On-prem deploy
  • Architected against
  • ISO 10218
  • ISO/TS 15066
  • IEC 61508
  • ISO 13849
  • not certified today

One adapter per vendor · the kernel doesn't care which

  • Verified today
  • Universal Robots
  • Dobot
  • Available on contract
  • KUKA
  • FANUC
  • ABB
  • Yaskawa
  • ROS 2 stacks

Verified end-to-end on UR3e and Dobot Nova in simulation, against vendor-published URDF twins. New controllers are added one adapter at a time. Same kernel, same audit trail, same SLO. Each onboarding produces a contract-bound adapter, not a one-off integration.

HOW IT WORKS

AI proposes. SafeKernels decides.
Motors execute.

A safety layer between your AI planner and your robots. Every command is checked against the live state of the cell before any motor moves.

01 Planner

Your AI drives the cell.

Connect any AI planner, LLM agent, or scripted controller. It proposes commands. SafeKernels stands between the planner and the motors.

proposes
02 Kernel live

Every command checked first.

Three independent checkers verify the command against the live state of the cell. They must agree. Risky moves get a mathematical proof of safety.

signs
03 Motors

No approval, no movement.

Approved commands cross to the motors as a signed permission slip that expires in half a second. If anything is wrong, the cell holds position.

THE PROBLEM

Five vendors. Five protocols.
Zero shared ground truth.

Most factories already run robots from four or five different makers. Each speaks its own protocol. Each enforces safety on its own hardware. Nothing on the floor sees the whole picture, and the LLM you let plan tasks definitely doesn't.

  1. 01 · Integration

    Every robot is a fresh integration

    OPC-UA, EtherNet/IP, FOCAS, Modbus, ROS 2, months of glue code per cell. Each vendor change starts the clock again.

  2. 02 · Safety

    Each vendor protects its own arm

    A "safe" command on one robot can still collide with the robot working next to it. Vendor controllers don't see the cell.

  3. 03 · Coordination

    Coordination lives in brittle scripts

    There's no shared model of the floor, just duct-tape between systems and an LLM that hopes for the best.

THE PLATFORM

One adapter per vendor. One shared graph. One deterministic kernel.

THE KERNEL

Deterministic Cognitive Kernel

Three in-process replicas evaluate every proposed command as a graph query against the live cell. Trust and confidence route the proposal to the fast rule path (microseconds) or the Z3 SMT slow path (bounded). 2-of-3 quorum approves; any disagreement rejects. Approved commands cross the HAL only as a signed ApprovalToken, with a 500 ms TTL.

  • FAST PATHμs-scale rule check
  • SLOW PATHZ3 SMT, 200 ms ceiling
  • QUORUM2 of 3, no fail-open
  • BOUNDARYtyped token, 500 ms TTL
Read the architecture
  1. 01

    Semantic Adapters

    One adapter per vendor. OPC-UA, Modbus, ROS 2, FOCAS2: every input normalises to the same SemanticMessage shape downstream.

  2. 02

    Knowledge-Graph Twin

    A live, typed model of the floor: every robot, part, zone. Updated 125 times a second; safety checks are graph pattern queries on a shadow clone.

  3. 03

    Audit Trail

    Every approval and rejection committed to a SHA-256 hash-chained WAL. Tampering is detected, not assumed away.

READING THE KERNEL

What the prototype actually enforces today.

Six engineering invariants of the running system. The fast path verifies a command in tens of microseconds. The slow path is a Z3 proof bounded by a hard timeout that fails to SAFE_STATE, never fail-open.

200 ms

Hard ceiling on a Z3 proof. Past that, the kernel rejects the command and the cell holds position.

Verifier · SAFE_STATE on timeout

3 / 3
Replicas evaluate every command. 2-of-3 quorum approves; any disagreement rejects.
Kernel · replica quorum
500 ms
Lifetime of a signed ApprovalToken before it expires at the HAL boundary.
HAL boundary · token TTL
125 Hz
Decision rate. Every proposed command is checked at the cell tick, not on a best-effort interval.
Kernel · decision pipeline
SHA-256
Tamper-evident hash chain over every kernel decision in the WAL.
Audit log · hash chain
4
Named degradation states: Normal, Degraded, SafeState, Emergency. Transitions are explicit, not implicit.
Degradation · explicit transitions
WHY DETERMINISTIC

Not a guardrail. A safety kernel.

Example kernel decision log. First entry: a move command for the UR3e arm passes fast-path checks and Z3 verification in 38 milliseconds and is approved with a quorum of three out of three replicas. Second entry, 216 milliseconds later: a move command for the KUKA arm exceeds the 1.5 radians-per-second velocity limit, is rejected in 41 microseconds, and the cell is held in SAFE_STATE.
[2026-04-30 09:52:33.317] cmd=c-1f8a · agent=plan-α → arm=ur3e_a
  move(tcp=[0.42, 0.10, 0.31], vel=0.6m/s)
  fast-path  ✓ workspace_zone · ✓ velocity_limit · ✓ joint_bounds
  z3-verify  ✓ no_collision  (38ms · shadow-kg)
  → APPROVED · token=ak-7c2 · ttl=500ms · quorum=3/3

[2026-04-30 09:52:33.533] cmd=c-1f8b · agent=plan-α → arm=kuka_b
  move(j4=+1.80rad, vel=2.4rad/s)
  fast-path  ✗ velocity > 1.5rad/s  (rule: cobot_class.vel)
  → REJECTED · code=VEL_LIMIT · SAFE_STATE held · 41μs
Proven, not promised
Z3 SMT proofs on a shadow graph. Bounded timeout. Never fails open.
Vendor-blind
One adapter per protocol. Downstream sees one schema, not seven.
Tamper-evident
Hash-chained WAL of every decision. Mutation is detected, not assumed away.
IS THIS FOR YOU?

Built for a specific kind of factory. Tell us in 30 seconds.

SafeKernels is in a closed beta with a handful of design partners. We're upfront about who it's for, and who it's not for yet.

You're a fit if
  • You run a real cell with at least two robot vendors (UR, KUKA, FANUC, ABB, Dobot, Siemens, ROS 2…).
  • You have an LLM-driven planner in production or a serious 2026 plan.
  • A near-miss or rework event would cost six figures or trigger a safety audit.
  • You have an engineering champion who can stand up a pilot in one cell.
Not yet a fit if
  • You're a single-vendor shop with no AI / LLM in the loop.
  • You need a fully certified, SOC 2-stamped vendor today.
  • You're a research lab without a real cell or hardware.
  • You can't carve out four weeks for a guided pilot.
HOW IT'S DIFFERENT

Where SafeKernels sits in the stack.

Comparison of SafeKernels against LLM guardrails, vendor PLCs, and an in-house stack across formal verification, determinism, multi-vendor support, federation, integration time, and audit trail.
SafeKernels LLM guardrails Vendor PLCs In-house stack
Formal verificationZ3 SMT, bounded timeoutLimitedRare
Determinism3-replica quorum + Z3ProbabilisticPer-robot onlyVaries
Multi-vendor supportOne adapter per protocolDoesn't touch hardwareVendor-lockedMonths of glue code
FederationFactoryState snapshotsBilateral integrations
Integration timeHours per protocolN/A, text onlyWeeks per cell6-12 months
Audit trailSHA-256 hash-chained WALText logsPer-controller, no chain-of-custodyCSV exports
WHAT SHIPS TODAY

Built for the factory floor.
And the procurement review.

Below: what runs in the prototype today. Hosted SaaS, formal certification, and procurement artefacts are explicitly on the roadmap, not claimed today.

Shipping today

Full audit trail
Every approval and rejection committed to a hash-chained WAL. Tampering escalates to EMERGENCY.
Kernel attestation software
Kernel boot publishes a SHA-256 digest of the policy set and firmware identifier. TPM hardware attestation is on the roadmap.

On the roadmap

Hosted SaaS
The kernel runs entirely on your hardware today; there is no SafeKernels cloud yet.
Standards certification
Architected to map to ISO 10218, ISO/TS 15066, IEC 61508, ISO 13849. Not certified today.
DESIGN PARTNER PROGRAM

Pre-revenue. Closed beta. Three slots open.

Design partners get founder-level engineering access, joint architecture decisions, joint whitepaper rights, and the ability to register custom safety patterns directly in the kernel.

What ships, what's bounded, what's logged.

Verification pipeline, standards mapping, failure model, threat model, written for safety and controls engineers, not marketing.